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Abstract
In this paper we study resource allocation in decentralized information local public good networks. A network
is a local public good network if each user’s actions directly affect the utility of an arbitrary subset of network
users. We consider networks where each user knows only that part of the network that either affects or is affected
by it. Furthermore, each user’s utility and action space are its private information, and each user is a self utility
maximizer. This network model is motivated by several applications including wireless communications. For this
network model we formulate a decentralized resource allocation problem and develop a decentralized resource
allocation mechanism (game form) that possesses the following properties: (i) All Nash equilibria of the game
induced by the mechanism result in allocations that are optimal solutions of the corresponding centralized resource
allocation problem (Nash implementation). (ii) All users voluntarily participate in the allocation process specified
by the mechanism (individual rationality). (iii) The mechanism results in budget balance at all Nash equilibria and
off equilibrium.
I. INTRODUCTION
In networks individuals’ actions often influence the performance of their directly connected neighbors.
Such an influence of individuals’ actions on their neighbors’ performance can propagate through the
network affecting the performance of the entire network. Examples include several real world networks.
As an instance, in a wireless cellular network, the transmission of the base station to a given user (an
action corresponding to this user) creates interference to the reception of other users and affects their
performance. In an urban network, when a jurisdiction institutes a pollution abatement program, the
benefits also accrue to nearby communities. The influence of neighbors is also observed in the spread
of information and innovation in social and research networks. Networks with above characteristics are
called local public good networks.
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2A local public good network differs from a typical public good system in that a local public good
(alternatively, the action of an individual) is accessible to and directly influences the utilities of individuals
in a particular neighborhood within a big network. On the other hand a public good is accessible to and
directly influences the utilities of all individuals in the system ([1, Chapter 11]). Because of the localized
interactions of individuals, in local public good networks (such as ones described above) the information
about the network is often localized; i.e., the individuals are usually aware of only their neighborhoods
and not the entire network. In many situations the individuals also have some private information about the
network or their own characteristics that are not known to anybody else in the network. Furthermore, the
individuals may also be selfish who care only about their own benefit in the network. Such a decentralized
information local public good network with selfish users gives rise to several research issues. In the next
section we provide a literature survey on prior research in local public good networks.
A. Literature survey
There exists a large literature on local public goods within the context of local public good provisioning
by various municipalities that follows the seminal work of [2]. These works mainly consider network
formation problems in which individuals choose where to locate based on their knowledge of the revenue
and expenditure patterns (on local public goods) of various municipalities. In this paper we consider the
problem of determining the levels of local public goods (actions of network agents) for a given network;
thus, the problem addressed in this paper is distinctly different from those in the above literature. Recently,
Bramoulle´ and Kranton [3] and Yuan [4] analyzed the influence of selfish users’ behavior on the provision
of local public goods in networks with fixed links among the users. The authors of [3] study a network
model in which each user’s payoff equals its benefit from the sum of efforts (treated as local public
goods) of its neighbors less a cost for exerting its own effort. For concave benefit and linear costs, the
authors analyze Nash equilibria (NE) of the game where each user’s strategy is to choose its effort level
that maximizes its own payoff from the provisioning of local public goods. The authors show that at
such NE, specialization can occur in local public goods provisioning. Specialization means that only a
subset of individuals contribute to the local public goods and others free ride. The authors also show that
specialization can benefit the society as a whole because among all NE, the ones that are “specialized”
result in the highest social welfare (sum of all users’ payoffs). However, it is shown in [3] that none
of the NE of abovementioned game can result in a local public goods provisioning that achieves the
maximum possible social welfare. In [4] the work of [3] is extended to directed networks where the
3externality effects of users’ efforts on each others’ payoffs can be unidirectional or bidirectional. The
authors of [4] investigate the relation between the structure of directed networks and the existence and
nature of Nash equilibria of users’ effort levels in those networks. For that matter they introduce a notion
of ergodic stability to study the influence of perturbation of users’ equilibrium efforts on the stability of
NE. However, none of the NE of the game analyzed in [4] result in a local public goods provisioning
that achieves optimum social welfare.
In this paper we consider a generalization of the network models investigated in [3], [4]. Specifically, we
consider a fixed network where the actions of each user directly affect the utilities of an arbitrary subset
of network users. In our model, each user’s utility from its neighbors’ actions is an arbitrary concave
function of its neighbors’ action profile. Each user in our model knows only that part of the network
that either affects or is affected by it. Furthermore, each user’s utility and action space are its private
information, and each user is a self utility maximizer. Even though the network model we consider has
similarities with those investigated in [3], [4], the problem of local public goods provisioning we formulate
in this paper is different from those in [3], [4]. Specifically, we formulate a problem of local public goods
provisioning in the framework of implementation theory 1 and address questions such as – How should the
network users communicate so as to preserve their private information, yet make it possible to determine
actions that achieve optimum social welfare? How to provide incentives to the selfish users to take actions
that optimize the social welfare? How to make the selfish users voluntarily participate in any action
determination mechanism that aims to optimize the social welfare? In a nutshell, the prior work of [3],
[4] analyzed specific games, with linear cost functions, for local public good provision, whereas our work
focusses on designing a mechanism that can induce, via nonlinear tax functions, “appropriate” games
among the network users so as to implement the optimum social welfare in NE. It is this difference in
the tax functions that distinguishes our results from those of [3], [4].
Previous works on implementation approach (Nash implementation) for (pure) public goods can be
found in [9], [10], [11], [12]. For our work, we obtained inspiration from [10]. In [10] Hurwicz presents
a Nash implementation mechanism that implements the Lindahl allocation (optimum social welfare) for a
public good economy. Hurwicz’ mechanism also possesses the properties of individual rationality (i.e. it
induces the selfish users to voluntarily participate in the mechanism) and budget balance (i.e. it balances
the flow of money in the system). A local public good network can be thought of as a limiting case
1Refer to [5], [6], [7] and [8, Chapter 3] and for an introduction to implementation theory.
4of a public good network, in which the influence of each public good tends to vanish on a subset of
network users. However, taking the corresponding limits in the Hurwicz’ mechanism does not result in
a local public good provisioning mechanism with all the original properties of the Hurwicz’ mechanism.
In particular, such a limiting mechanism does not retain the budget balance property which is very
important to avoid any scarcity/wastage of money. In this paper we address the problem of designing
a local public good provisioning mechanism that possesses the desirable properties of budget balance,
individual rationality, and Nash implementation of optimum social welfare. The mechanism we develop
is more general than Hurwicz’ mechanism; Hurwicz’ mechanism can be obtained as a special case of our
mechanism by setting Ri = Cj = N ∀ i, j,∈ N (the special case where all users’ actions affect all users’
utilities) in our mechanism. Our mechanism also proivdes a more efficient way to achieve the properties
of Nash implementation, individual rationality, and budget balance as it uses, in general, a much smaller
message space than Hurwicz’ mechanism. To the best of our knowledge the resource allocation problem
and its solution that we present in this paper is the first attempt to analyze a local public goods network
model in the framework of implementation theory. Below we state our contributions.
B. Contribution of the paper
The key contributions of this paper are: 1) The formulation of a problem of local public goods provi-
sioning in the framework of implementation theory. 2) The specification of a game form 2 (decentralized
mechanism) for the above problem that, (i) implements in NE the optimal solution of the corresponding
centralized local public good provisioning problem; (ii) is individually rational; 3 and (iii) results in budget
balance at all NE and off equilibrium.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II-A we present the model of local public
good network. In Section II-C we formulate the local public good provisioning problem. In Section III-A
we present a game form for this problem and discuss its properties in Section III-B. We conclude in
Section IV with a discussion on future directions.
Notation used in the paper: We use bold font to represent vectors and normal font for scalars. We
use bold uppercase letters to represent matrices. We represent the element of a vector by a subscript on
the vector symbol, and the element of a matrix by double subscript on the matrix symbol. To denote
the vector whose elements are all xi such that i ∈ S for some set S, we use the notation (xi)i∈S and
2See [8, Chapter 3] and [7], [6], [5] for the definition of “game form”.
3Refer to [8, Chapter 3] and [7] for the definition of “individual rationality” and “implementation in NE.”
5we abbreviate it as xS . We treat bold 0 as a zero vector of appropriate size which is determined by the
context. We use the notation (xi,x∗/i) to represent a vector of dimension same as that of x∗, whose ith
element is xi and all other elements are the same as the corresponding elements of x∗. We represent a
diagonal matrix of size N ×N whose diagonal entries are elements of the vector x ∈ RN by diag(x).
II. THE LOCAL PUBLIC GOOD PROVISIONING PROBLEM
In this section we present a model of local public good network motivated by various applications such
as wireless communication [8, Chapter 5], social and information networks [4], [3]. We first describe the
components of the model and the assumptions we make on the properties of the network. We then present
a resource allocation problem for this model and formulate it as an optimization problem.
A. The network model (M)
We consider a network consisting of N users and one network operator. We denote the set of users by
N := {1, 2, . . . , N}. Each user i ∈ N has to take an action ai ∈ Ai where Ai is the set that specifies
user i’s feasible actions. In a real network, a user’s actions can be consumption/generation of resources
or decisions regarding various tasks. We assume that,
Assumption 1: For all i ∈ N , Ai is a convex and compact set in R that includes 0. 4 Furthermore, for
each user i ∈ N , the set Ai is its private information, i.e. Ai is known only to user i and nobody else in
the network.
Because of the users’ interactions in the network, the actions taken by a user directly affect the performance
of other users in the network. Thus, the performance of the network is determined by the collective actions
of all users. We assume that the network is large-scale, therefore, every user’s actions directly affect only
a subset of network users in N . Thus we can treat each user’s action as a local public good. We depict
the above feature by a directed graph as shown in Fig. 1. In the graph, an arrow from j to i indicates that
user j affects user i; we represent the same in the text as j → i. We assume that i → i for all i ∈ N .
Mathematically, we denote the set of users that affect user i by Ri := {k ∈ N | k → i}. Similarly,
we denote the set of users that are affected by user j by Cj := {k ∈ N | j → k}. We represent the
interactions of all network users together by a graph matrix G := [Gij]N×N . The matrix G consists of 0’s
and 1’s, where Gij = 1 represents that user i is affected by user j, i.e. j ∈ Ri and Gij = 0 represents no
4In this paper we assume the sets Ai, i ∈ N , to be in R for simplicity. However, the decentralized mechanism and the results we present
in this paper can be easily generalized to the scenario where for each i ∈ N , Ai ⊂ Rni is a convex and compact set in higher dimensional
space Rni . Furthermore, each space Rni can be of a different dimension ni for different i ∈ N .
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Fig. 1. A local public good network
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Cj(2) = k
Ihj = 1 = Iij + 1
Cj(1) = h
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Fig. 2. Illustration of indexing rule for set Cj shown in Fig. 1. Index Irj of user
r ∈ Cj is indicated on the arrow directed from j to r. The notation to denote these
indices and to denote the user with a particular index is shown outside the dashed
boundary demarcating the set Cj .
influence of user j on user i, i.e. j /∈ Ri. Note that G need not be a symmetric matrix. Because i → i,
Gii = 1 for all i ∈ N . We assume that,
Assumption 2: The sets Ri, Ci, i ∈ N , are independent of the users’ action profile aN := (ak)k∈N ∈∏
k∈N Ak. Furthermore, for each i ∈ N , |Ci| ≥ 3.
We consider the condition |Ci| ≥ 3, i ∈ N , so as to ensure construction of a mechanism that is budget
balanced at all possible allocations, those that correspond to Nash equilibria as well as those that correspond
to off-equilibrium messages. For examples of applications where Assumption 2 holds, see Section II-B
and [4], [3].
We assume that,
Assumption 3: Each user i ∈ N knows that the set of feasible actions Aj of each of its neighbors
j ∈ Ri is a convex and compact subset of R that includes 0.
The performance of a user that results from actions taken by the users affecting it is quantified by a
utility function. We denote the utility of user i ∈ N resulting from the action profile aRi := (ak)k∈Ri by
ui(aRi). We assume that,
Assumption 4: For all i ∈ N , the utility function ui : R|Ri| → R ∪ {−∞} is concave in aRi and
ui(aRi) = −∞ for ai /∈ Ai. 5 The function ui is user i’s private information.
The assumptions that ui is concave and is user i’s private information are motivated by applications
described in Section II-B and [4], [3]. The assumption that ui(aRi) = −∞ for ai /∈ Ai captures the fact
that an action profile (aRi) is of no significance to user i if ai /∈ Ai. We assume that,
Assumption 5: Each network user i ∈ N is selfish, non-cooperative, and strategic.
5Note that ai is always an element of aRi because i→ i and hence i ∈ Ri.
7Assumption 5 implies that the users have an incentive to misrepresent their private information, e.g. a
user i ∈ N may not want to report to other users or to the network operator its true preference for the
users’ actions, if this results in an action profile in its own favor.
Each user i ∈ N pays a tax ti ∈ R to the network operator. This tax can be imposed for the following
reasons: (i) For the use of the network by the users. (ii) To provide incentives to the users to take actions
that achieve a network-wide performance objective. The tax is set according to the rules specified by a
mechanism and it can be either positive or negative for a user. With the flexibility of either charging a
user (positive tax) or paying compensation/subsidy (negative tax) to a user, it is possible to induce the
users to behave in a way such that a network-wide performance objective is achieved. For example, in a
network with limited resources, we can set “positive tax” for the users that receive resources close to the
amounts requested by them and we can pay “compensation” to the users that receive resources that are not
close to their desirable ones. Thus, with the available resources, we can satisfy all the users and induce
them to behave in a way that leads to a resource allocation that is optimal according to a network-wide
performance criterion. We assume that,
Assumption 6: The network operator does not have any utility associated with the users’ actions or
taxes. It does not derive any profit from the users’ taxes and acts like an accountant that redistributes the
tax among the users according to the specifications of the allocation mechanism.
Assumption 6 implies that the tax is charged in a way such that
∑
i∈N
ti = 0. (1)
To describe the “overall satisfaction” of a user from the performance it receives from all users’ actions
and the tax it pays for it, we define an “aggregate utility function” uAi (aRi , ti) : R|Ri|+1 → R ∪ {−∞}
for each user i ∈ N :
uAi (aRi , ti) :=
 −ti + ui(aRi), if ai ∈ Ai, aj ∈ R, j ∈ Ri\{i},−∞, otherwise. (2)
Because ui and Ai are user i’s private information (Assumptions 1 and 4), the aggregate utility uAi is also
user i’s private information. As stated in Assumption 5, users are non-cooperative and selfish. Therefore,
the users are self aggregate utility maximizers.
In this paper we restrict attention to static problems, i.e. we assume,
8Assumption 7: The set N of users, the graph G, users’ action spaces Ai, i ∈ N , and their utility
functions ui, i ∈ N , are fixed in advance and they do not change during the time period of interest.
We also assume that,
Assumption 8: Every user i ∈ N knows the set Ri of users that affect it as well as the set Ci of users
that are affected by it. The network operator knows Ri and Ci for all i ∈ N .
In networks where the sets Ri and Ci are not known to the users beforehand, Assumption 8 is still
reasonable because of the following reason. As the graph G does not change during the time period
of interest (Assumption 7), the information about the neighbor sets Ri and Ci, i ∈ N , can be passed
to the respective users by the network operator before the users determine their actions. Alternatively,
the users can themselves determine the set of their neighbors before determining their actions. 6 Thus,
Assumption 8 can hold true for the rest of the action determination process. In the next section we present
some applications that motivate Model (M).
B. Applications
1) Application A: Power allocation in cellular networks: Consider a single cell downlink wireless
data network consisting of a Base Station (BS) and N mobile users as shown in Fig. 3. The BS uses
BS
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aNh0N
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N
Fig. 3. A downlink network with N mobile
users and one base station
Ad 1
Ad 2 Ad 3
Ad 2
Ad 1 Ad 4
Ad 4
Ad 2 Ad 3
(i) (ii) (iii)
Fig. 4. Three display ad clusters, each consisting of one main ad and
two sub ads.
Code Division Multiple Access technology (CDMA) to transmit data to the users and each mobile user
uses Minimum Mean Square Error Multi-User Detector (MMSE-MUD) receiver to decode its data. The
signature codes used by the BS are not completely orthogonal as this helps increase the capacity of the
network. Because of non-orthogonal codes, each user experiences interference due to the BS transmissions
intended for other users. However, as the users in the cell are at different distances from the BS, and
6The exact method by which the users get information about their neighbor sets in a real network depends on the network characteristics.
9the power transmitted by the BS undergoes propagation loss, not all transmissions by the BS create
interference to every user. For example, let us look at arcs 1 and N shown in Fig. 3 that are centered at
the BS. Suppose the radius of arc 1 is much smaller than that of arc N . Then, the signal transmitted by
the BS for users inside circle 1 (that corresponds to arc 1) will become negligible when it reaches outside
users such as user N or user 2. On the other hand, the BS signals transmitted for user N and user 2
will be received with significant power by the users inside circle 1. This asymmetric interference relation
between the mobile users can be depicted in a graph similar to one shown in Fig. 1. In the graph an
arrow from j to i would represent that the signal transmitted for user j also affects user i. Note that since
the signal transmitted for user i must reach i, the assumption i → i made in Section II-A holds in this
case. If the users do not move very fast in the network, the network topology can be assumed to be fixed
for small time periods. Therefore, if the BS transmits some pilot signals to all network users, the users
can figure out which signals are creating interference to their signal reception. Thus, each user would
know its (interfering) neighbor set as assumed in Assumption 8. Note that if the power transmitted by the
BS to the users change, it may result in a change in the set of interfering neighbors of each user. This
is different from Assumption 2 in Model (M). However, if the transmission power fluctuations resulting
from a power allocation mechanism are not large, the set of interfering neighbors can be assumed to be
fixed, and this can be approximated by Assumption 2.
The Quality of Service (QoS) that a user receives from decoding its data is quantified by a utility
function. Due to interference the utility ui(·) of user i, i ∈ N , is a function of the vector aRi , where aj
is the transmission power used by the BS to transmit signals to user j, j ∈ N , and Ri is the set of users
such that the signals transmitted by the BS to users in Ri also reach user i. Note that in this case all
transmissions, in other words the actions ai, i ∈ N , are carried out by the BS unlike Model (M) where
each user i ∈ N takes its own action ai. However, as we discuss below, the BS is only an agent which
executes the outcome of the mechanism that determines these transmission powers. Thus, we can embed
the downlink network scenario into Model (M) by treating each ai as a decision “corresponding” to user
i, i ∈ N , which is executed by the BS for i. Since each user uses an MMSE-MUD receiver, a measure
of user i’s (i ∈ N ) utility can be the negative of the MMSE at the output of its receiver, 7 i.e.,
ui(aRi) = −MMSEi = − min
zTi ∈R1×N
E[‖bi − zTi yi‖2] = −
[
(I +
2
N0i
SiXRiSi)
−1]
ii
, i ∈ N . (3)
7See [13] for the derivation of (3).
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In (3) bi is the transmitted data symbol for user i, yi is the output of user i’s matched filter generated
from its received data, I is the identity matrix of size N × N , N0i/2 is the two sided power spectral
density (PSD) of thermal noise, XRi is the cross-correlation matrix of signature waveforms corresponding
to the users j ∈ Ri, and Si := diag((Sij)j∈Ri) is the diagonal matrix consisting of the signal amplitudes
Sij, j ∈ Ri, received by user i. Sij is related to aj as S2ij = ajh0i, j ∈ Ri, where h0i is the channel gain
from the BS to user i which represents the power loss along this path. As shown in [14], [7], the utility
function given by (3) is close to concave in aRi . Thus, Assumption 4 in Model (M) can be thought of as
an approximation to the downlink network scenario.
Note that to compute user i’s utility given in (3), knowledge of N0i, XRi , and h0i is required. The BS
knows XRi for each i ∈ N as it selects the signature waveform for each user. On the other hand, user
i, i ∈ N , knows the PSD N0i of thermal noise and the channel gain h0i as these can be measured only
at the respective receiver. Consider a network where the mobile users are selfish and non cooperative.
Then, these users may not want to reveal their measured values N0i and h0i. On the other hand if the
network operator that owns the BS does not have a utility and is not selfish, then, the BS can announce
the signature waveforms it uses for each user. Thus, each user i ∈ N would know its corresponding cross
correlation matrix XRi and consequently, its utility function ui. However, since N0i and h0i are user i’s
private information, the utility function ui is private information of i which is similar to Assumption 4 in
Model (M). If the wireless channel conditions vary slowly compared to the time period of interest, the
channel gains and hence the users’ utility functions can be assumed to be fixed. As mentioned earlier, for
slowly moving users the network topology and hence the set of interfering neighbors can also be assumed
to be fixed. These features are captured by Assumption 7 in Model (M).
In the presence of limited resources, the provision of desired QoS to all network users may not be
possible. To manage the provision of QoS under such a situation the network operator (BS) can charge
tax to the users and offer them the following tradeoff. It charges positive tax to the users that obtain a QoS
close to their desirable one, and compensates the loss in the QoS of other users by providing a subsidy
to them. Such a redistribution of money among users through the BS is possible under Assumption 6 in
Model (M).
2) Application B: Online advertising: Consider an online guaranteed display (GD) ad system. In
existing GD systems, individual advertisers sign contracts with web-publishers in which web-publishers
11
agree to serve (within some given time period) a fixed number of impressions 8 of each ad for a lump
sum payment. Here we consider an extension of current GD systems in which multiple advertisers can
form clusters as shown in Fig. 4 and contracts can be signed for the number of impressions of each
cluster. Figure 4 shows three display ad clusters. In each ad cluster there is one main ad and two sub
ads. For example in Fig. 4-(i), ad 1 is the main ad and ad 2 and ad 3 are the two sub ads. Suppose that
the ad clusters are formed in a way so that in each cluster, the main ad creates a positive externality 9
to the sub ads. For example, ad 1 can be a Honda ad, whereas ad 2 and ad 3 can be ads of local
Honda dealer and local Honda mechanic. We call the ad cluster in which ad i appears as the main ad
as cluster i. 10 The arrangements of ads in clusters can be described by a graph similar to one shown
in Fig. 1. In this graph an arrow from j to i would represent that ad i appears in cluster j. For each
impression of cluster i, i ∈ {1, 2, 4}, advertiser i pays some fixed prespecified amount of money (bid)
bi ∈ R+ to the web publisher. Suppose the bid bi is known only to advertiser i and the web publisher. Let
ai, i ∈ {1, 2, 4}, denote the number of impressions of clusters i delivered to the users. Furthermore, let
Amaxi be the maximum number of impressions advertiser i can request for cluster i, i.e. 0 ≤ ai ≤ Amaxi .
The constraint Amaxi may arise due to the budget constraint of advertiser i, or due to the restrictions
imposed by the web publisher. For these reasons Amaxi may be private information of advertiser i (similar
to Assumption 1) or private knowledge between advertiser i and the web publisher. Note that in the ad
network, the number of impressions ai, i ∈ {1, 2, 4}, can take only natural number values; therefore, the
assumption of convex action sets Ai, i ∈ N , in Assumption 1 can be thought of as an approximation to
this case. Note also that in the above ad network example, no cluster is associated with advertiser 3 or
the web publisher (i.e. there is no cluster with main ad 3 or an ad of the web publisher). Such a scenario
can be captured by Model (M) by associating dummy action variables a3 and a0 with advertiser 3 and
web publisher respectively, and assuming Amax3 = A
max
0 = 0.
Because of the way clusters are formed, each advertiser obtains a non-negative utility from the impres-
sions of the clusters that it is part of. Thus we can represent the utilities of the four advertisers in the ad
8A display instance of an ad
9See [1, Chapter 11] for the definition of externality.
10We assume that there is at most one ad cluster in which ad i appears as the main ad; hence such a notation is well defined.
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network of Fig. 4 as follows:
u1(a1, a2) = c11a1 + c12a2 − b1a1
u2(a1, a2, a4) = c21a1 + c22a2 + c24a4 − b2a2
u3(a1, a4) = c31a1 + c34a4
u4(a2, a4) = c42a2 + c44a4 − b4a4.
(4)
In (4) cij ∈ R+, i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} are non negative real valued constants. The constant cij represents the
value obtained by advertiser i from each impression of cluster j. Suppose that for each j, cij is advertiser
i’s private information. The term −biai, i ∈ {1, 2, 4} represents the loss in utility/monetary value incurred
by advertiser i due to the prespecified payment it makes to the web publisher. Because the web publisher
receives payments from the advertisers, it also obtains a utility as follows:
u0(a1, a2, a4) = b1a1 + b2a2 + b4a4. (5)
Since each bid bi, i ∈ {1, 2, 4}, is known to the web publisher, and none of the advertisers know all of
these bids, the utility function u0 is web publisher’s private information. Similarly, since cij for each j and
the bid bi are private information of advertiser i, for each i ∈ {1, 2, 4} the utility function ui is advertiser
i’s private information. These properties of utility functions along with their linearity given by (4) and (5)
are modeled by Assumption 4 in Model (M). If we assume that the arrangements of ads in clusters and
the bids bi, i ∈ {1, 2, 4}, of advertisers are predetermined, and do not change with any decision regarding
the impressions delivery of various clusters, then this leads to assumptions 2 and 7 in Model (M).
As represented by (4), each advertiser benefits from a number of other advertisers by being part of their
ad clusters. For this reason, in addition to making a direct payment to the web publisher, each advertiser
should also make a payment to those advertisers that create positive externalities to it. Furthermore,
because of their mutual payments the web publisher may offer discounts to the advertisers in their direct
payments to her. These discounts can indirectly encourage advertisers to participate in the clustered GD
ad scheme. However, one problem in the implementation of above type of payments/discounts is that
in a big network, the advertisers may not have direct contracts with all their cluster sharing advertisers.
Furthermore, if the advertisers and the web publisher are strategic and self utility maximizers, they would
try to negotiate payments so as to get cluster impressions that maximize their respective utilities. In such
a scenario, the abovementioned distribution of money among advertisers and the web publisher can be
13
facilitated through a third party ad agency to which all advertisers and the web publisher can subscribe.
The role of an ad agency can be mapped to that of the network operator in Model (M).
Having discussed various applications that motivate Model (M), we now go back to this generic model
and formulate a resource allocation problem for it.
C. The decentralized local public good provisioning problem (PD)
For the network model (M) we wish to develop a mechanism to determine the users’ action and
tax profiles (aN , tN ) := ((a1, a2, . . . , aN), (t1, t2, . . . , tN)). We want the mechanism to work under the
decentralized information constraints of the model and to lead to a solution to the following centralized
problem.
The centralized problem (PC)
max
(aN ,tN )
∑
i∈N
uAi (aRi , ti)
s.t.
∑
i∈N
ti = 0
(6)
≡ max
(aN ,tN )∈D
∑
i∈N
ui(aRi)
where, D := {(aN , tN ) ∈ R2N | ai ∈ Ai ∀ i ∈ N ;
∑
i∈N
ti = 0}
(7)
The centralized optimization problem (6) is equivalent to (7) because for (aN , tN ) /∈ D, the objective
function in (6) is negative infinity by (2). Thus D is the set of feasible solutions of Problem (PC). Since
by Assumption 4, the objective function in (7) is concave in aN and the sets Ai, i ∈ N , are convex and
compact, there exists an optimal action profile a∗N for Problem (PC). Furthermore, since the objective
function in (7) does not explicitly depend on tN , an optimal solution of Problem (PC) must be of the
form (a∗N , tN ), where tN is any feasible tax profile for Problem (PC), i.e. a tax profile that satisfies (1).
The solutions of Problem (PC) are ideal action and tax profiles that we would like to obtain. If there
exists an entity that has centralized information about the network, i.e. it knows all the utility functions
ui, i ∈ N , and all action spaces Ai, i ∈ N , then that entity can compute the above ideal profiles by solving
Problem (PC). Therefore, we call the solutions of Problem (PC) optimal centralized allocations. In the
network described by Model (M), there is no entity that knows perfectly all the parameters that describe
Problem (PC) (Assumptions 1 and 4). Therefore, we need to develop a mechanism that allows the network
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users to communicate with one another and that leads to optimal solutions of Problem (PC). Since a key
assumption in Model (M) is that the users are strategic and non-cooperative, the mechanism we develop
must take into account the users’ strategic behavior in their communication with one another. To address
all of these issues we take the approach of implementation theory [5] for the solution of the decentralized
local public good provisioning problem for Model (M). Henceforth we call this decentralized allocation
problem as Problem (PD). In the next section we present a decentralized mechanism (game form) for local
public good provisioning that works under the constraints imposed by Model (M) and achieves optimal
centralized allocations.
III. A DECENTRALIZED LOCAL PUBLIC GOOD PROVISIONING MECHANISM
For Problem (PD), we want to develop a game form (message space and outcome function) that is
individually rational, budget balanced, and that implements in Nash equilibria the goal correspondence
defined by the solution of Problem (PC). 11 Individual rationality guarantees voluntary participation of
the users in the allocation process specified by the game form, budget balance guarantees that there
is no money left unclaimed/unallocated at the end of the allocation process (i.e. it ensures (1)), and
implementation in NE guarantees that the allocations corresponding to the set of NE of the game induced
by the game form are a subset of the optimal centralized allocations (solutions of Problem (PC)).
We would like to clarify at this point the definition of individual rationality (voluntary participation)
in the context of our problem. Note that in the network model (M), the participation/non-participation of
each user determines the network structure and the set of local public goods (users’ actions) affecting
the participating users. To define individual rationality in this setting we consider our mechanism to be
consisting of two stages as discussed in [15, Chapter 7]. In the first stage, knowing the game form,
each user makes a decision whether to participate in the game form or not. The users who decide not
to participate are considered out of the system. Those who decide to participate follow the game form
to determine the levels of local public goods in the network formed by them. 12 In such a two stage
mechanism, individual rationality implies the following. If the network formed by the participating users
satisfies all the properties of Model (M), 13 then, at all NE of the game induced by the game form among
11The definition of game form, goal correspondence, individual rationality, budget balance and implementation in Nash equilibria is given
in [8, Chapter 3].
12This network is a subgraph obtained by removing the nodes corresponding to non-participating users from the original graph (directed
network) constructed by all the users in the system.
13In particular, the network formed by the participating users must satisfy Assumption 2 that there are at least three users affected by
each local public good in this network. Note that all other assumptions of Model (M) automatically carry over to the network formed by
any subset of the users in Model (M).
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the participating users, the utility of each participating user will be at least as much as its utility without
participation (i.e. if it is out of the system).
We would also like to clarify the rationale behind choosing NE as the solution concept for our problem.
Note that because of assumptions 1 and 4 in Model (M), the environment of our problem is one of
incomplete information. Therefore one may speculate the use of Bayesian Nash or dominant strategy as
appropriate solution concepts for our problem. However, since the users in Model (M) do not possess
any prior beliefs about the utility functions and action sets of other users, we cannot use Bayesian Nash
as a solution concept for Model (M). Furthermore, because of impossibility results for the existence of
non-parametric efficient dominant strategy mechanisms in classical public good environments [16], we do
not know if it is possible to design such mechanisms for the local public good environment of Model (M).
The well known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms that achieve incentive compatibility and
efficiency with respect to non-numeraire goods, do not guarantee budget balance [16]. Hence they are
inappropriate for our problem as budget balance is one of the desirable properties in our problem. VCG
mechanisms are also unsuitable for our problem because they are direct mechanisms and any direct
mechanism would require infinite message space to communicate the generic continuous (and concave)
utility functions of users in Model (M). Because of all of above reasons, and the known existence results
for non-parametric, individually rational, budget-balanced Nash implementation mechanisms for classical
private and public goods environments [16], we choose Nash as the solution concept for our problem.
We adopt Nash’s original “mass action” interpretation of NE [17, page 21]. Implicit in this interpretation
is the assumption that the problems’s environment is stable, that is, it does not change before the agents
reach their equilibrium strategies. This assumption is consistent with our Assumption 7. Nash’s “mass
action” interpretation of NE has also been adopted in [16, pp. 69-70], [18, page 664], [7], and [19], [20].
Specifically, by quoting [18], “we interpret our analysis as applying to an unspecified (message exchange)
process in which users grope their way to a stationary message and in which the Nash property is a
necessary condition for stationarity.”
We next construct a game form for the resource allocation problem (PD) that achieves the abovemen-
tioned desirable properties – Nash implementation, individual rationality, and budget balance.
A. The game form
In this section we present a game form for the local public good provisioning problem presented in
Section II-C. We provide explicit expressions of each of the components of the game form, the message
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space and the outcome function. We assume that the game form is common knowledge among the users
and the network operator.
The message space: Each user i ∈ N sends to the network operator a message mi ∈ R|Ri|×R|Ri|+ =:
Mi of the following form:
mi := ( a
i
Ri , pi
i
Ri); a
i
Ri ∈ R|Ri|, pii Ri ∈ R|Ri|+ , (8)
where, ai Ri := ( a
i
k)k∈Ri ; pi
i
Ri := ( pi
i
k)k∈Ri , i ∈ N . (9)
User i also sends the component ( ai k, pi
i
k), k ∈ Ri, of its message to its neighbor k ∈ Ri. In this message,
ai k is the action proposal for user k, k ∈ Ri, by user i, i ∈ N . Similarly, pii k is the price that user i, i ∈ N ,
proposes to pay for the action of user k, k ∈ Ri. A detailed interpretation of these message elements is
given in Section III-B.
The outcome function: After the users communicate their messages to the network operator, their actions
and taxes are determined as follows. For each user i ∈ N , the network operator determines the action aˆi
of user i from the messages communicated by its neighbors that are affected by it (set Ci), i.e. from the
message profile mCi := (mk)k∈Ci:
aˆi(mCi) =
1
|Ci|
∑
k∈Ci
ak i, i ∈ N . (10)
To determine the users’ taxes the network operator considers each set Cj , j ∈ N , and assigns indices
1, 2, . . . , |Cj| in a cyclic order to the users in Cj . Each index 1, 2, . . . , |Cj| is assigned to an arbitrary
but unique user i ∈ Cj . Once the indices are assigned to the users in each set Cj , they remain fixed
throughout the time period of interest. We denote the index of user i associated with set Cj by Iij . The
index Iij ∈ {1, 2, . . . , |Cj|} if i ∈ Cj , and Iij = 0 if i /∈ Cj . Since for each set Cj, each index 1, 2, . . . , |Cj|
is assigned to a unique user i ∈ Cj , therefore, ∀ i, k ∈ Cj such that i 6= k, Iij 6= Ikj . Note also that for any
user i ∈ N , and any j, k ∈ Ri, the indices Iij and Iik are not necessarily the same and are independent
of each other. We denote the user with index k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , |Cj|} in set Cj by Cj(k). Thus, Cj(Iij) = i for
i ∈ Cj . The cyclic order indexing means that, if Iij = |Cj|, then Cj(Iij+1) = Cj(1), Cj(Iij+2) = Cj(2), and so
on. In Fig. 2 we illustrate the above indexing rule for the set Cj shown in Fig. 1.
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Based on the above indexing, the users’ taxes tˆi, i ∈ N , are determined as follows.
tˆi((mCj)j∈Ri) =
∑
j∈Ri
lij(mCj) aˆj(mCj) +
∑
j∈Ri
pii j
(
ai j − a
Cj(Iij+1)
j
)2
−
∑
j∈Ri
pi
Cj(Iij+1)
j
(
a
Cj(Iij+1)
j − a
Cj(Iij+2)
j
)2 (11)
where, lij(mCj) = pi
Cj(Iij+1)
j − pi
Cj(Iij+2)
j, j ∈ Ri, i ∈ N . (12)
We would like to emphasize here that the presence of the network operator is necessary for strategy-
proofness and implementation of the above game form. A detailed discussion on the need and significance
of the network operator is presented in Section III-C.
The game form given by (8)–(12) and the users’ aggregate utility functions in (2) induce a game
(×i∈NMi, (aˆi, tˆi)i∈N , {uAi }i∈N ). In this game, the set of network users N are the players, the set of strate-
gies of a user is its message spaceMi, and a user’s payoff is its utility uAi
((
aˆj(mCj)
)
j∈Ri , tˆi
(
(mCj)j∈Ri
))
that it obtains at the allocation determined by the communicated messages. We define a NE of this game
as a message profile m∗N that has the following property: ∀ i ∈ N and ∀mi ∈Mi,
uAi
((
aˆj(m
∗
Cj)
)
j∈Ri , tˆi
(
(m∗Cj)j∈Ri
)) ≥ uAi ((aˆj(mi,m∗Cj/i))j∈Ri , tˆi((mi,m∗Cj/i)j∈Ri)). (13)
As discussed earlier, NE in general describe strategic behavior of users in games of complete information.
This can be seen from (13) where, to define a NE, it requires complete information of all users’ aggregate
utility functions. However, the users in Model (M) do not know each other’s utilities; therefore, the game
induced by the game form (8)–(12) and the users’ aggregate utility functions (2) is not one of complete
information. Therefore, for our problem we adopt the NE interpretation of [18] and [16, Section 4] as
discussed at the beginning of Section III. That is, we interpret NE as the “stationary” messages of an
unspecified (message exchange) process that are characterized by the Nash property (13).
In the next section we show that the allocations obtained by the game form presented in (8)–(12) at
all NE message profiles (satisfying (13)), are optimal centralized allocations.
B. Properties of the game form
We begin this section with an intuitive discussion on how the game form presented in Section III-A
achieves optimal centralized allocations. We then formalize the results in Theorems 1 and 2.
To understand how the proposed game form achieves optimal centralized allocations, let us look at
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the properties of NE allocations corresponding to this game form. A NE of the game induced by the
game form (8)–(12) and the users’ utility functions (2) can be interpreted as follows: Given the users’
messages mk, k ∈ Ci, the outcome function computes user i’s action as 1/|Ci|
(∑
k∈Ci a
k
i
)
. Therefore,
user i’s action proposal ai i can be interpreted as the increment that i desires over the sum of other users’
action proposals for i, so as to bring its allocated action aˆi to its own desired value. Thus, if the action
computed for i based on its neighbors’ proposals does not lie in Ai, user i can propose an appropriate
action ai i and bring its allocated action within Ai. The flexibility of proposing any action ai i ∈ R gives
each user i ∈ N the capability to bring its allocation aˆi within its feasible set Ai by unilateral deviation.
Therefore, at any NE, aˆi ∈ Ai, ∀ i ∈ N . By taking the sum of taxes in (11) it can further be seen,
after some computations, that the allocated tax profile (tˆi)i∈N satisfies (1) (even at off-NE messages).
Thus, all NE allocations
(
(aˆi(m
∗
Ci))i∈N , (tˆi((m
∗
Cj)j∈Ri))i∈N
)
lie in D and hence are feasible solutions
of Problem (PC).
To see further properties of NE allocations, let us look at the tax function in (11). The tax of user i
consists of three types of terms. The type-1 term is
∑
j∈Ri lij(mCj) aˆj(mCj); it depends on all action
proposals for each of user i’s neighbors j ∈ Ri, and the price proposals for each of these neighbors by
users other than user i. The type-2 term is
∑
j∈Ri pi
i
j
(
ai j − a
Cj(Iij+1)
j
)2
; this term depends on ai Ri as
well as pii Ri . Finally, the type-3 term is the following: −
∑
j∈Ri pi
Cj(Iij+1)
j×
(
a
Cj(Iij+1)
j − a
Cj(Iij+2)
j
)2
;
this term depends only on the messages of users other than i. Since pii Ri does not affect the determination
of user i’s action, and affects only the type-2 term in tˆi, the NE strategy of user i, i ∈ N , that minimizes its
tax is to propose for each j ∈ Ri, pii j = 0 unless at the NE, ai j = a
Cj(Iij+1)
j . Since the type-2 and type-3
terms in the users’ tax are similar across users, for each i ∈ N and j ∈ Ri, all the users k ∈ Cj choose the
above strategy at NE. Therefore, the type-2 and type-3 terms vanish from every users’ tax tˆi, i ∈ N , at all
NE. Thus, the tax that each user i ∈ N pays at a NE m∗N is of the form
∑
j∈Ri lij(m
∗
Cj) aˆj(m
∗
Cj). The NE
term lij(m∗Cj), i ∈ N , j ∈ Ri, can therefore be interpreted as the “personalized price” for user i for the
NE action aˆj(m∗Cj) of its neighbor j. Note that at a NE, the personalized price for user i is not controlled
by i’s own message. The reduction of the users’ NE taxes into the form
∑
j∈Ri lij(m
∗
Cj) aˆj(m
∗
Cj) implies
that at a NE, each user i ∈ N has a control over its aggregate utility only through its action proposal. 14
If all other users’ messages are fixed, each user has the capability of shifting the allocated action profile
14Note that user i’s action proposal determines the actions of all the users j ∈ Ri; thus, it affects user i’s utility ui
((
aˆj(m
∗
Cj )
)
j∈Ri
)
as
well as its tax
∑
j∈Ri lij(m
∗
Cj ) aˆj(m
∗
Cj ).
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aˆRi to its desired value by proposing an appropriate a
i
Ri ∈ R|Ri| (See the discussion in the previous
paragraph). Therefore, the NE strategy of each user i ∈ N is to propose an action profile ai Ri that results
in an allocation aˆRi that maximizes its aggregate utility. Thus, at a NE, each user maximizes its aggregate
utility for its given personalized prices. By the construction of the tax function, the sum of the users’ tax
is zero at all NE and off equilibria. Thus, the individual aggregate utility maximization of the users also
result in the maximization of the sum of users’ aggregate utilities subject to the budget balance constraint
which is the objective of Problem (PC).
It is worth mentioning at this point the significance of type-2 and type-3 terms in the users’ tax. As
explained above, these two terms vanish at NE. However, if for some user i ∈ N these terms are not
present in its tax tˆi, then, the price proposal pii Ri of user i will not affect its tax and hence, its aggregate
utility. In such a case, user i can propose arbitrary prices pii Ri because they would affect only other users’
NE prices. The presence of type-2 and type-3 terms in user i’s tax prevent such a behavior as they impose
a penalty on user i if it proposes a high value of pii Ri or if its action proposal for its neighbors deviates
too much from other users’ proposals. Even though the presence of type-2 and type-3 terms in user i’s
tax is necessary as explained above, it is important that the NE price lij(m∗Cj), j ∈ Ri of user i ∈ N is
not affected by i’s own proposal pii Ri . This is because, in such a case, user i may influence its own NE
price in an unfair manner and may not behave as a price taker. To avoid such a situation, the type-2 and
type-3 terms are designed in a way so that they vanish at NE. Thus, this construction induces price taking
behavior in the users at NE and leads to optimal allocations.
The results that formally establish the above properties of the game form are summarized in Theorems 1
and 2 below.
Theorem 1: Let m∗N be a NE of the game induced by the game form presented in Section III-A and the
users’ utility functions (2). Let (aˆ∗N , tˆ
∗
N ) := (aˆN (m
∗
N ), tˆN (m
∗
N )) :=
(
(aˆi(m
∗
Ci))i∈N , (tˆi((m
∗
Cj)j∈Ri))i∈N
)
be the action and tax profiles at m∗N determined by the game form. Then,
(a) Each user i ∈ N weakly prefers its allocation (aˆ∗Ri , tˆ∗i ) to the initial allocation (0, 0). Mathematically,
uAi
(
aˆ∗Ri , tˆ
∗
i
)
≥ uAi
(
0, 0
)
, ∀ i ∈ N .
(b) (aˆ∗N , tˆ
∗
N ) is an optimal solution of Problem (PC). 
Theorem 2: Let aˆ∗N be an optimum action profile corresponding to Problem (PC). Then,
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(a) There exist a set of personalized prices l∗ij, j ∈ Ri, i ∈ N , such that
aˆ∗Ri = arg max
aˆi∈Ai
aˆj∈R, j∈Ri\{i}
−
∑
j∈Ri
l∗ij aˆj + ui(aˆRi), ∀ i ∈ N .
(b) There exists at least one NEm∗N of the game induced by the game form presented in Section III-A and
the users’ utility functions (2) such that, aˆN (m∗N ) = aˆ
∗
N . Furthermore, if tˆ
∗
i :=
∑
j∈Ri l
∗
ij aˆ
∗
j , i ∈ N ,
the set of all NE m∗N = (m
∗
i )i∈N = ( a
i ∗
Ri , pi
i ∗
Ri) that result in (aˆ
∗
N , tˆ
∗
N ) is characterized by the
solution of the following set of conditions:
1
|Ci|
∑
k∈Ci
ak ∗i = aˆ
∗
i , i ∈ N ,
Cj(Iij+1)pi∗j − Cj(Iij+2)pi∗j = l∗ij, j ∈ Ri, i ∈ N ,
pii ∗j
(
ai ∗j − Cj(Iij+1)a∗j
)2
= 0, j ∈ Ri, i ∈ N ,
pii ∗j ≥ 0, j ∈ Ri, i ∈ N . 
Because Theorem 1 is stated for an arbitrary NE m∗N of the game induced by the game form of
Section III-A and the users’ utility functions (2), the assertion of the theorem holds for all NE of this
game. Thus, part (a) of Theorem 1 establishes that the game form presented in Section III-A is individually
rational, i.e., at any NE allocation, the aggregate utility of each user is at least as much as its aggregate
utility before participating in the game/allocation process. Because of this property of the game form,
each user voluntarily participates in the allocation process. Part (b) of Theorem 1 asserts that all NE of
the game induced by the game form of Section III-A and the users’ utility functions (2) result in optimal
centralized allocations (solutions of Problem (PC)). Thus the set of NE allocations is a subset of the set
of optimal centralized allocations. This establishes that the game form of Section III-A implements in NE
the goal correspondence defined by the solutions of Problem (PC). Because of this property, the above
game form guarantees to provide an optimal centralized allocation irrespective of which NE is achieved
in the game induced by it.
The assertion of Theorem 1 that establishes the above two properties of the game form presented in
Section III-A is based on the assumption that there exists a NE of the game induced by this game form
and the users’ utility functions (2). However, Theorem 1 does not say anything about the existence of NE.
Theorem 2 asserts that NE exist in the above game, and provides conditions that characterize the set of all
NE that result in optimal centralized allocations of the form (aˆ∗N , tˆ
∗
N ) = (aˆ
∗
N , (
∑
j∈Ri l
∗
ij aˆ
∗
j)i∈N ), where
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aˆ∗N is any optimal centralized action profile. In addition to the above, Theorem 2 also establishes the
following property of the game form. Since the optimal action profile aˆ∗N in the statement of Theorem 2
is arbitrary, the theorem implies that the game form of Section III-A can obtain each of the optimum
action profiles of Problem (PC) through at least one of the NE of the induced game. This establishes that
the above game form is not biased towards any particular optimal centralized action profile.
We present the proofs of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 in Appendices I and II. In Appendix III we also
present an example to illustrate how the properties established by Theorems 1 and 2 are achieved by the
proposed game form.
In the next section we present a discussion on how the proposed game form can be implemented in a
real system, i.e., how the message communication and the determination of allocations specified by the
game form can be carried out in a real system.
C. Implementation of the game form
We explain in this section how the game form of Section III-A can be implemented in the presence of
a network operator, and why the presence of a network operator is necessary for the implementation of
the game form. To this end let us first suppose that the network operator is not present in the network.
As discussed in Section III-A the outcome function specifies the allocation (aˆi, tˆi) for a user i ∈ N based
on its neighbors’ messages. Since the game form is common knowledge among the users, if each user
announces its messages to all its neighbors, every user can have the required set of messages to compute
its own allocations. However, with this kind of local communication, the messages required to compute
user i’s allocation are not necessarily known to users other than i. Therefore, even though the other users
know the outcome function for user i, no other user can check if the allocation determined by user i
corresponds to its neighbors’ messages. Since each user i ∈ N is selfish, it cannot be relied upon for the
determination of its allocation. Therefore, in large-scale systems such as one represented by Model (M),
where each user does not hear all other users’ messages, the presence of a network operator is extremely
important. The network operator’s role is twofold. First, according to the specification of the game form
(of Section III-A) each user announces its messages to its neighbors as well as to the network operator.
The network operator knows the network structure (Assumption 8) and the outcome function for each user.
Thus, it can compute all the allocations based on the messages it receives, and then it can tell each user
its corresponding allocation (or it can check whether the allocation (a∗i , t
∗
i ) implemented by user i, i ∈ N ,
is the same as that specified by the mechanism). The other role of the network operator that facilitates
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implementation of the game form is the following. Note that the game form specifies redistribution of
money among the users by charging each user an appropriate positive or negative tax (see (1)). This means
that the tax money must go from one subset of the users to the other subset of users. Since the users do
not have complete network information, nor do they know the allocations of other users in the network,
they cannot determine the appropriate flow of money in the network. The network operator implements
this redistribution of money by acting as an accountant that collects money from the users who must
pay positive tax according to the game form and gives the money back to the users who must receive
subsidies (negative tax).
IV. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The problem formulation and the solution of the local public goods provisioning problem presented
in this paper open up several new directions for future research. First, the development of efficient
mechanisms that can compute NE is an important open problem. To address this problem there can be two
different directions. (i) The development of algorithms that guarantee convergence to Nash equilibria of the
games constructed in this paper. (ii) The development of alternative mechanisms/game forms that lead to
games with dynamically stable NE. Second, the network model we studied in this paper assumed a given
set of users and a given network topology. In many local public good networks such as social or research
networks, the set of network users and the network topology must be determined as part of network
objective maximization. These situations give rise to interesting admission control and network formation
problems many of which are open research problems. Finally, in this paper we focused on static resource
allocation problem where the characteristics of the local public good network do not change with time. The
development of implementation mechanisms under dynamic situations, where the network characteristics
change during the determination of resource allocation, are open research problems.
Acknowledgments: This work was supported in part by NSF grant CCF-1111061. The authors are
grateful to Y. Chen and A. Anastasopoulos at the University of Michigan for stimulating discussions.
REFERENCES
[1] A. Mas-Colell, M. D. Whinston, and J. R. Green, Microeconomic theory. Oxford University Press, 2002.
[2] C. M. Tiebout, “A pure theory of local expenditures,” The Journal of Political Economy, vol. 64, no. 5, pp. 416–424, October 1956.
[3] Y. Bramoulle´ and R. Kranton, “Public goods in networks,” Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 135, pp. 478–494, 2007.
[4] K. chih Yuan, “Public goods in directed networks,” preprint.
[5] M. Jackson, “A crash course in implementation theory,” in Social choice and welfare, 2001, pp. 655–708.
23
[6] T. Stoenescu and D. Teneketzis, “Decentralized resource allocation mechanisms in networks: realization and implementation,” in
Advances in Control, Communiation Networks, and Transportation Systems, E. H. A. Birkh¨ruser, Ed., 2005, pp. 225–263, in honor of
Pravin Varaiya.
[7] S. Shrutivandana and D. Teneketzis, “A game-theoretic approach to decentralized optimal power allocation for cellular networks,”
Telecommunication Systems journal, vol. 47, pp. 65–80, 2011.
[8] S. Sharma, “A mechanism design approach to decentralized resource allocation in wireless and large-scale networks: Realization and
implementation,” Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 2009.
[9] T. Groves and J. Ledyard, “Optimal allocation of public goods: A solution to the ‘free rider’ problem,” Econometrica, vol. 45, pp.
783–809, 1977.
[10] L. Hurwicz, “Outcome functions yielding Walrasian and Lindahl allocations at Nash equilibrium points,” Review of Economic studies,
vol. 46, pp. 217–225, 1979.
[11] M. Walker, “A simple incentive compatible scheme for attaining Lindahl allocations,” Econometrica, vol. 49, pp. 65–71, 1981.
[12] Y. chen, “A family of supermodular mechanisms implementing Lindahl allocations for quasilinear environments,” Economic Theory,
vol. 19, no. 4, pp. 773–790, 2002.
[13] S. Verdu, Multiuser detection. Cambridge university press, 2003.
[14] S. Shrutivandana and D. Teneketzis, “An externalities-based decentralized optimal power allocation algorithm for wireless networks,”
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, vol. 17, no. 6, pp. 1819–1831, Dec. 2009.
[15] D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole, Game theory. The MIT Press, 1991.
[16] T. Groves and J. Ledyard, “Incentive compatibility since 1972.” In T. Groves, R. Radner and S. Reiter, editors, Information, Incentives,
and Economic Mechanisms: Essays in Honor of Leonid Hurwicz, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1987, pp. 48–109.
[17] J. F. Nash, “Non-cooperative games,” Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Mathematics, Princeton University, May 1950.
[18] S. Reichelstein and S. Reiter, “Game forms with minimal message space,” Econometrica, vol. 56, no. 3, pp. 661–692, May 1988.
[19] A. Kakhbod and D. Teneketzis, “An efficient game form for unicast service provisioning,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control,
vol. 57, no. 2, pp. 392–404, February 2012.
[20] ——, “Power allocation and spectrum sharing in multi-user multi-channel systems with strategic users,” To appear in IEEE Transactions
on Automatic Control, August 2012.
[21] S. Boyd and L. Vandenberghe, Convex optimization. Cambridge university press, 2004.
In Appendices I and II that follow, we present the proof of Theorems 1 and 2, respectively. We divide
the proof into several claims to organize the presentation. In Appendix III we present an example to
illustrate how the properties established by Theorems 1 and 2 are achieved by the proposed game form.
APPENDIX I
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We prove Theorem 1 in four claims. In Claims 2 and 3 we show that all users weakly prefer a NE
allocation (corresponding to the game form presented in Section III-A) to their initial allocations; these
claims prove part (a) of Theorem 1. In Claim 1 we show that a NE allocation is a feasible solution of
Problem (PC). In Claim 4 we show that a NE action profile is an optimal action profile for Problem (PC).
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Thus, Claim 1 and Claim 4 establish that a NE allocation is an optimal solution of Problem (PC) and
prove part (b) of Theorem 1.
Claim 1: If m∗N is a NE of the game induced by the game form presented in Section III-A and the
users’ utility functions (2), then the action and tax profile (aˆ∗N , tˆ
∗
N ) := (aˆN (m
∗
N ), tˆN (m
∗
N )) is a feasible
solution of Problem (PC), i.e. (aˆ∗N , tˆ
∗
N ) ∈ D.
Proof: We prove the feasibility of the NE action and tax profiles in two steps. First we prove the feasibility
of the NE tax profile, then we prove the feasibility of the NE action profile.
To prove the feasibility of NE tax profile, we need to show that it satisfies (1). For this, we first take
the sum of second and third terms on the Right Hand Side (RHS) of (11) over all i ∈ N , i.e.
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈Ri
[
pii j
(
ai j − a
Cj(Iij+1)
j
)2
− piCj(Iij+1) j
(
a
Cj(Iij+1)
j − a
Cj(Iij+2)
j
)2 ]
. (14)
From the construction of the graph matrix G and the sets Ri and Cj , i, j ∈ N , the sum
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈Ri(·)
is equal to the sum
∑
j∈N
∑
i∈Cj(·). Therefore, we can rewrite (14) as
∑
j∈N
[∑
i∈Cj
pii j
(
ai j − a
Cj(Iij+1)
j
)2
−
∑
i∈Cj
pi
Cj(Iij+1)
j
(
a
Cj(Iij+1)
j − a
Cj(Iij+2)
j
)2 ]
. (15)
Note that both the sums inside the square brackets in (15) are over all i ∈ Cj . Because of the cyclic
indexing of the users in each set Cj , j ∈ N , these two sums are equal. Therefore the overall sum in (15)
evaluates to zero. Thus, the sum of taxes in (11) reduces to
∑
i∈N
tˆi((mCj)j∈Ri) =
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈Ri
lij(mCj) aˆj(mCj). (16)
Combining (12) and (16) we obtain
∑
i∈N
tˆi((mCj)j∈Ri) =
∑
j∈N
[∑
i∈Cj
pi
Cj(Iij+1)
j −
∑
i∈Cj
pi
Cj(Iij+2)
j
]
aˆj(mCj) = 0. (17)
The second equality in (17) follows because of the cyclic indexing of the users in each set Cj , j ∈ N ,
which makes the two sums inside the square brackets in (17) equal. Because (17) holds for any arbitrary
message profile mN , it follows that at NE m∗N ,∑
i∈N
tˆi((m
∗
Cj)j∈Ri) = 0. (18)
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To complete the proof of Claim 1, we have to prove that for all i ∈ N , aˆi(m∗Ci) ∈ Ai. We prove
this by contradiction. Suppose aˆ∗i /∈ Ai for some i ∈ N . Then, from (2), uAi (aˆ∗Ri , tˆ∗i ) = −∞. Consider
m˜i = (( a˜
i
i, a
i ∗
Ri/i), pi
i ∗
Ri) where a
i ∗
k, k ∈ Ri\{i}, and pii ∗Ri are respectively the NE action and price
proposals of user i and a˜i i is such that
aˆi(m˜i,m
∗
Ci/i) =
1
|Ci|
(
a˜i i +
∑
k∈Ci
k 6=i
ak ∗i
)
∈ Ai. (19)
Note that the flexibility of user i in choosing any message ai Ri ∈ R|Ri| (see (8)) allows it to choose an
appropriate a˜i i that satisfies the condition in (19). For the message m˜i constructed above,
uAi
((
aˆk(m˜i,m
∗
Ck/i)
)
k∈Ri , tˆi
(
(m˜i, m
∗
Cj/i)j∈Ri
))
=− tˆi
(
(m˜i, m
∗
Cj/i)j∈Ri
)
+ ui
((
aˆk(m˜i,m
∗
Ck/i)
)
k∈Ri
)
> −∞ = uAi (aˆ∗Ri , tˆ∗i ).
(20)
Thus if aˆi(m∗Ci) /∈ Ai user i finds it profitable to deviate to m˜i. Inequality (20) implies that m∗N cannot
be a NE, which is a contradiction. Therefore, at any NE m∗N , we must have aˆi(m
∗
Ci) ∈ Ai ∀ i ∈ N . This
along with (18) implies that, (aˆ∗N , tˆ
∗
N ) ∈ D.
Claim 2: If m∗N is a NE of the game induced by the game form presented in Section III-A and the
users’ utility functions (2), then, the tax tˆi((m∗Cj)j∈Ri) =: tˆ
∗
i paid by user i, i ∈ N , at the NE m∗N is of
the form tˆ∗i =
∑
j∈Ri l
∗
ij aˆ
∗
j , where l
∗
ij = lij(m
∗
Cj) and aˆ
∗
j = aˆj(m
∗
Cj).
Proof: Let m∗N be the NE specified in the statement of Claim 2. Then, for each i ∈ N ,
uAi
((
aˆk(mi,m
∗
Ck/i)
)
k∈Ri , tˆi
(
(mi, m
∗
Cj/i)j∈Ri
)) ≤ uAi (aˆ∗Ri , tˆ∗i), ∀mi ∈Mi. (21)
Substituting mi = ( ai ∗Ri , pi
i
Ri), pi
i
Ri ∈ R|Ri|+ , in (21) and using (10) implies that
uAi
(
aˆ∗Ri , tˆi
(
(( ai ∗Ri , pi
i
Ri), m
∗
Cj/i)j∈Ri
)) ≤ uAi (aˆ∗Ri , tˆ∗i), ∀ pii Ri ∈ R|Ri|+ . (22)
Since uAi decreases in ti (see (2)), (22) implies that
tˆi
((
( ai ∗Ri , pi
i
Ri), m
∗
Cj/i
)
j∈Ri
)
≥ tˆ∗i , ∀ pii Ri ∈ R|Ri|+ . (23)
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Substituting (11) in (23) results in∑
j∈Ri
[
l∗ij aˆ
∗
j + pi
i
j
(
ai ∗j − Cj(Iij+1)a∗j
)2
− Cj(Iij+1)pi∗j
(
Cj(Iij+1)a∗j − Cj(Iij+2)a∗j
)2 ]
≥
∑
j∈Ri
[
l∗ij aˆ
∗
j + pi
i ∗
j
(
ai ∗j − Cj(Iij+1)a∗j
)2
− Cj(Iij+1)pi∗j
(
Cj(Iij+1)a∗j − Cj(Iij+2)a∗j
)2 ]
, ∀ pii Ri ∈ R|Ri|+ .
(24)
Canceling the common terms in (24) gives
∑
j∈Ri
( pii j − pii ∗j )
(
ai ∗j − Cj(Iij+1)a∗j
)2
≥ 0, ∀ pii Ri ∈ R|Ri|+ . (25)
Since (25) must hold for all pii Ri ∈ R|Ri|+ , we must have that
for each j ∈ Ri, either pii ∗j = 0 or ai ∗j = Cj(Iij+1)a∗j . (26)
From (26) it follows that at any NE m∗N ,
pii ∗j
(
ai ∗j − Cj(Iij+1)a∗j
)2
= 0, ∀ j ∈ Ri, ∀ i ∈ N . (27)
Note that (27) also implies that ∀ i ∈ N and ∀ j ∈ Ri,
Cj(Iij+1)pi∗j
(
Cj(Iij+1)a∗j − Cj(Iij+2)a∗j
)2
= 0. (28)
(28) follows from (27) because for each i ∈ N , j ∈ Ri also implies that j ∈ RCj(Iij+1) . Using (27) and
(28) in (11) we obtain that any NE tax profile must be of the form
tˆ∗i =
∑
j∈Ri
l∗ij aˆ
∗
j , ∀ i ∈ N . (29)
Claim 3: The game form given in Section III-A is individually rational, i.e. at every NE m∗N of the
game induced by this game form and the users’ utilities in (2), each user i ∈ N weakly prefers the
allocation (aˆ∗Ri , tˆ
∗
i ) to the initial allocation (0, 0). Mathematically,
uAi
(
0, 0
)
≤ uAi
(
aˆ∗Ri , tˆ
∗
i
)
, ∀ i ∈ N . (30)
Proof: Suppose m∗N is a NE of the game induced by the game form presented in Section III-A and the
users’ utility functions (2). From Claim 2 we know the form of users’ tax at m∗N . Substituting that from
27
(29) into (21) we obtain that for each i ∈ N ,
uAi
((
aˆk(mi,m
∗
Ck/i)
)
k∈Ri , tˆi
(
(mi, m
∗
Cj/i)j∈Ri
)) ≤ uAi (aˆ∗Ri ,∑
j∈Ri
l∗ij aˆ
∗
j
)
,
∀mi = ( ai Ri , pii Ri) ∈Mi.
(31)
Substituting for tˆi in (31) from (11) and using (28) we obtain,
uAi
((
aˆk
(
( ai Ri , pi
i
Ri),m
∗
Ck/i
))
k∈Ri
,
∑
j∈Ri
(
l∗ij aˆj
(
( ai Ri , pi
i
Ri),m
∗
Cj/i
)
+ pii j
(
ai j − a
Cj(Iij+1)
j
)2))
≤ uAi
(
aˆ∗Ri ,
∑
j∈Ri
l∗ij aˆ
∗
j
)
, ∀ ai Ri ∈ R|Ri|, ∀ pii Ri ∈ R|Ri|+ .
(32)
In particular, pii Ri = 0 in (32) implies that
uAi
((
aˆk
(
( ai Ri ,0),m
∗
Ck/i
))
k∈Ri
,
∑
j∈Ri
(
l∗ij aˆj
(
( ai Ri ,0),m
∗
Cj/i
))) ≤ uAi (aˆ∗Ri ,∑
j∈Ri
l∗ij aˆ
∗
j
)
, ∀ ai Ri ∈ R|Ri|.
(33)
Since (33) holds for all ai Ri ∈ R|Ri|, substituting in it 1|Cj |( ai j +
∑
k∈Cj\{i} a
k ∗
j) = aj ∀ j ∈ Ri implies,
uAi
((
aj
)
j∈Ri ,
∑
j∈Ri
(
l∗ij aj
)) ≤ uAi (aˆ∗Ri ,∑
j∈Ri
l∗ij aˆ
∗
j
)
, ∀ aRi := (aj)j∈Ri ∈ R|Ri|. (34)
For aRi = 0, (34) implies further that
uAi
(
0, 0
)
≤ uAi
(
aˆ∗Ri ,
∑
j∈Ri
l∗ij aˆ
∗
j
)
, ∀ i ∈ N . (35)
Claim 4: A NE allocation (aˆ∗N , tˆ
∗
N ) is an optimal solution of the centralized problem (PC).
Proof: For each i ∈ N , (34) can be equivalently written as
aˆ∗Ri ∈ arg max
aRi∈R|Ri|
uAi
(
aRi ,
∑
j∈Ri
l∗ij aj
)
= arg max
ai∈Ai
aj∈R, j∈Ri\{i}
{
−
∑
j∈Ri
l∗ij aj + ui(aRi)
} (36)
Let for each i ∈ N , fAi(ai) be a convex function that characterizes the set Ai as, ai ∈ Ai ⇔ fAi(ai) ≤ 0. 15
15By [21] we can always find a convex function that characterizes a convex set.
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Since for each i ∈ N , ui(aRi) is assumed to be concave in aRi and the set Ai is convex, the Karush
Kuhn Tucker (KKT) conditions [21, Chapter 11] are necessary and sufficient for aˆ∗Ri to be a maximizer
in (36). Thus, for each i ∈ N ∃ λi ∈ R+ such that, aˆ∗Ri and λi satisfy the KKT conditions given below:
∀ j ∈ Ri\{i}, l∗ij −∇ajui(aRi) |aRi=aˆ∗Ri = 0,
l∗ii −∇aiui(aRi) |aRi=aˆ∗Ri +λi∇aifAi(ai) |ai=aˆ∗i = 0,
λifAi(aˆ
∗
i ) = 0.
(37)
For each i ∈ N , adding the KKT condition equations in (37) over k ∈ Ci results in∑
k∈Ci
l∗ki −∇ai
∑
k∈Ci
uk(aRk) |aRk=aˆ∗Rk +λi∇aifAi(ai) |ai=aˆ∗i = 0. (38)
From (12) we have,
∑
k∈Ci
l∗ki =
∑
k∈Ci
(Ci(Iki+1)pi∗i − Ci(Iki+2)pi∗i ) = 0. (39)
Substituting (39) in (38) we obtain 16 ∀ i ∈ N ,
−∇ai
∑
k∈Ci
uk(aRk) |aRk=aˆ∗Rk +λi∇aifAi(ai) |ai=aˆ∗i = 0,
λifAi(aˆ
∗
i ) = 0.
(40)
The conditions in (40) along with the non-negativity of λi, i ∈ N , specify the KKT conditions (for variable
aˆN ) for Problem (PC). Since (PC) is a concave optimization problem, KKT conditions are necessary and
sufficient for optimality. As shown in (40), the action profile aˆ∗N satisfies these optimality conditions.
Furthermore, the tax profile tˆ∗N satisfies, by its definition,
∑
i∈N tˆ
∗
i = 0. Therefore, the NE allocation
(aˆ∗N , tˆ
∗
N ) is an optimal solution of Problem (PC). This completes the proof of Claim 4 and hence, the
proof of Theorem 1.
Claims 1–4 (Theorem 1) establish the properties of NE allocations based on the assumption that there
exists a NE of the game induced by the game form of Section III-A and users’ utility functions (2).
However, these claims do not guarantee the existence of a NE. This is guaranteed by Theorem 2 which
is proved next in Claims 5 and 6.
16The second equality in (40) is one of the KKT conditions from (37).
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APPENDIX II
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
We prove Theorem 2 in two steps. In the first step we show that if the centralized problem (PC) has
an optimal action profile aˆ∗N , there exist a set of personalized prices, one for each user i ∈ N , such
that when each i ∈ N individually maximizes its own utility taking these prices as given, it obtains
aˆ∗Ri as an optimal action profile. In the second step we show that the optimal action profile aˆ
∗
N and the
corresponding personalized prices can be used to construct message profiles that are NE of the game
induced by the game form of Section III-A and users’ utility functions in (2).
Claim 5: If Problem (PC) has an optimal action profile aˆ∗N , there exist a set of personalized prices
l∗ij, j ∈ Ri, i ∈ N , such that
aˆ∗Ri ∈ arg max
aˆi∈Ai
aˆj∈R, j∈Ri\{i}
−
∑
j∈Ri
l∗ij aˆj + ui(aˆRi), ∀ i ∈ N . (41)
Proof: Suppose aˆ∗N is an optimal action profile corresponding to Problem (PC). Writing the optimization
problem (PC) only in terms of variable aˆN gives
aˆ∗N ∈ arg max
aˆN
∑
i∈N
ui(aˆRi)
s.t. aˆi ∈ Ai, ∀ i ∈ N .
(42)
As stated earlier, an optimal solution of Problem (PC) is of the form (aˆ∗N , tˆN ), where aˆ
∗
N is a solution
of (42) and tˆN ∈ RN is any tax profile that satisfies (1). Because KKT conditions are necessary for
optimality, the optimal solution in (42) must satisfy the KKT conditions. This implies that there exist
λi ∈ R+, i ∈ N , such that for each i ∈ N , λi and aˆ∗N satisfy
−∇aˆi
∑
k∈Ci
uk(aˆRk) |aˆRk=aˆ∗Rk +λi∇aˆifAi(aˆi) |aˆi=aˆ∗i = 0,
λifAi(aˆ
∗
i ) = 0,
(43)
where fAi(·) is the convex function defined in Claim 4. Defining for each i ∈ N ,
l∗ij := ∇aˆjui(aˆRi) |aˆRi=aˆ∗Ri , j ∈ Ri\{i},
l∗ii := ∇aˆiui(aˆRi) |aˆRi=aˆ∗Ri −λi∇aˆifAi(aˆi) |aˆi=aˆ∗i ,
(44)
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we get ∀ i ∈ N ,
∑
k∈Ci
l∗ki = ∇aˆi
∑
k∈Ci
uk(aˆRk) |aˆRk=aˆ∗Rk −λi∇aˆifAi(aˆi) |aˆi=aˆ∗i = 0. (45)
The second equality in (45) follows from (43). Furthermore, (44) implies that ∀ i ∈ N ,
∀ j ∈ Ri\{i}, l∗ij −∇aˆjui(aˆRi) |aˆRi=aˆ∗Ri = 0,
l∗ii −∇aˆiui(aˆRi) |aˆRi=aˆ∗Ri +λi∇aˆifAi(aˆi) |aˆi=aˆ∗i = 0.
(46)
The equations in (46) along with the second equality in (43) imply that for each i ∈ N , aˆ∗Ri and λi satisfy
the KKT conditions for the following maximization problem:
max
aˆi∈Ai
aˆj∈R, j∈Ri\{i}
−
∑
j∈Ri
l∗ij aˆj + ui(aˆRi) (47)
Because the objective function in (47) is concave (Assumption 4), KKT conditions are necessary and
sufficient for optimality. Therefore, we conclude from (46) and (43) that,
aˆ∗Ri ∈ arg max
aˆi∈Ai
aˆj∈R, j∈Ri\{i}
−
∑
j∈Ri
l∗ij aˆj + ui(aˆRi), ∀ i ∈ N .
Claim 6: Let aˆ∗N be an optimal action profile for Problem (PC), let l
∗
ij, j ∈ Ri, i ∈ N , be the
personalized prices corresponding to aˆ∗N as defined in Claim 5, and let tˆ
∗
i :=
∑
j∈Ri l
∗
ij aˆ
∗
j , i ∈ N . Let
m∗i := ( a
i ∗
Ri , pi
i ∗
Ri), i ∈ N , be a solution to the following set of relations:
1
|Ci|
∑
k∈Ci
ak ∗i = aˆ
∗
i , i ∈ N , (48)
Cj(Iij+1)pi∗j − Cj(Iij+2)pi∗j = l∗ij, j ∈ Ri, i ∈ N , (49)
pii ∗j
(
ai ∗j − Cj(Iij+1)a∗j
)2
= 0, j ∈ Ri, i ∈ N , (50)
pii ∗j ≥ 0, j ∈ Ri, i ∈ N . (51)
Then, m∗N := (m
∗
1,m
∗
2, . . . ,m
∗
N) is a NE of the game induced by the game form of Section III-A and
the users’ utility functions (2). Furthermore, for each i ∈ N , aˆi(m∗Ci) = aˆ∗i , lij(m∗Cj) = l∗ij, j ∈ Ri, and
tˆi((m
∗
Cj)j∈Ri) = tˆ
∗
i .
Proof: Note that, the conditions in (48)–(51) are necessary for any NE m∗N of the game induced by the
game form of Section III-A and users’ utilities (2), to result in the allocation (aˆ∗N , tˆ
∗
N ) (see (10), (12)
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and (27)). Therefore, the set of solutions of (48)–(51), if such a set exists, is a superset of the set of
all NE corresponding to the above game that result in (aˆ∗N , tˆ
∗
N ). Below we show that the solution set of
(48)–(51) is in fact exactly the set of all NE that result in (aˆ∗N , tˆ
∗
N ).
To prove this, we first show that the set of relations in (48)–(51) do have a solution. Notice that (48)
and (50) are satisfied by setting for each i ∈ N , ak ∗i = aˆ∗i ∀ k ∈ Ci. Notice also that for each j ∈ N ,
the sum over i ∈ Cj of the right hand side of (49) is 0. Therefore, for each j ∈ N , (49) has a solution
in ipi∗j , i ∈ Cj . Furthermore, for any solution ipi∗j , i ∈ Cj, j ∈ N , of (49), ipi∗j + c, i ∈ Cj, j ∈ N , where c
is some constant, is also a solution of (49). Consequently, by appropriately choosing c, we can select a
solution of (49) such that (51) is satisfied.
It is clear from the above discussion that (48)–(51) have multiple solutions. We now show that the
set of solutions m∗N of (48)–(51) is the set of NE that result in (aˆ
∗
N , tˆ
∗
N ). From Claim 5, (41) can be
equivalently written as
aˆ∗Ri ∈ arg max
aˆRi∈R|Ri|
uAi
(
aˆRi ,
∑
j∈Ri
l∗ij aˆj
)
, i ∈ N . (52)
Substituting aˆj|Cj| −
∑
k∈Cj\{i}
ka∗j =
iaj for each j ∈ Ri, i ∈ N , in (52) we obtain
ai ∗Ri ∈ arg max
ai Ri∈R
|Ri|
uAi
(( 1
|Cj|
(
iaj +
∑
k∈Cj\{i}
ka∗j
))
j∈Ri
,
∑
j∈Ri
l∗ij
1
|Cj|
(
iaj +
∑
k∈Cj\{i}
ka∗j
))
, i ∈ N . (53)
Because of (50), (53) also implies that
( ai ∗Ri , pi
i ∗
Ri) ∈ arg max
( ai Ri , pi
i
Ri )∈R
|Ri|×R|Ri|+
uAi
((
aˆj
(
(iaRi ,
ipiRi), m
∗
Cj/i
))
j∈Ri
,
∑
j∈Ri
l∗ij aˆj
(
(iaRi ,
ipiRi), m
∗
Cj/i
)−∑
j∈Ri
Cj(Iij+1)pi∗j
(
Cj(Iij+1)a∗j − Cj(Iij+2)a∗j
)2)
, i ∈ N .
(54)
Furthermore, since uAi is strictly decreasing in the tax (see (2)), (54) also implies the following:
( ai ∗Ri , pi
i ∗
Ri) ∈ arg max
( ai Ri , pi
i
Ri )∈R
|Ri|×R|Ri|+
uAi
((
aˆj
(
(iaRi ,
ipiRi),m
∗
Cj/i
))
j∈Ri
,
∑
j∈Ri
l∗ij aˆj
(
(iaRi ,
ipiRi),m
∗
Cj/i
)
+
∑
j∈Ri
ipij
(
iaj − Cj(Iij+1)a∗j
)2
−
∑
j∈Ri
Cj(Iij+1)pi∗j
(
Cj(Iij+1)a∗j − Cj(Iij+2)a∗j
)2)
, i ∈ N .
(55)
Eq. (55) implies that, if the message exchange and allocation is done according to the game form presented
in Section III-A, then user i, i ∈ N , maximizes its utility at m∗i when all other users j ∈ N\{i} choose
their respective messages m∗j , j ∈ N\{i}. This, in turn, implies that a message profile m∗N that is a
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solution to (48)–(51) is a NE of the game induced by the aforementioned game form and the users’
utilities (2). Furthermore, it follows from (48)–(51) that the allocation at m∗N is
aˆi(m
∗
Ci) =
1
|Ci|
∑
k∈Ci
ak ∗i = aˆ
∗
i , i ∈ N ,
lij(m
∗
Cj) =
Cj(Iij+1)pi∗j − Cj(Iij+2)pi∗j = l∗ij, j ∈ Ri, i ∈ N ,
tˆi
(
(m∗Cj)j∈Ri
)
=
∑
j∈Ri
lij(m
∗
Cj)aˆj(m
∗
Cj)+ pi
i ∗
j
(
ai ∗j − Cj(Iij+1)a∗j
)2
−Cj(Iij+1)pi∗j
(
Cj(Iij+1)a∗j − Cj(Iij+2)a∗j
)2
=
∑
j∈Ri
l∗ij aˆ
∗
i = tˆ
∗
i , i ∈ N .
(56)
From (56) it follows that the set of solutions m∗N of (48)–(51) is exactly the set of NE that result in
(aˆ∗N , tˆ
∗
N ). This completes the proof of Claim 6 and hence the proof of Theorem 2.
APPENDIX III
AN EXAMPLE TO ILLUSTRATE PROPERTIES OF THE GAME FORM
Consider a system with three users where each user’s action affects the utilities of all three users. Let
the sets of feasible actions of the users be A1 = A2 = A3 = [0, 1]. Suppose that the users’ utilities are:
u1(aˆ1, aˆ2, aˆ3) = aˆ
α1
1 − aˆβ22 − aˆβ33 , aˆ1 ∈ A1, (aˆ2, aˆ3) ∈ R2,
u2(aˆ1, aˆ2, aˆ3) = −aˆβ11 + aˆα22 − aˆβ33 , aˆ2 ∈ A2, (aˆ1, aˆ3) ∈ R2,
u3(aˆ1, aˆ2, aˆ3) = −aˆβ11 − aˆβ22 + aˆα33 , aˆ3 ∈ A3, (aˆ1, aˆ2) ∈ R2,
where, αi ∈ (0, 1), βi ∈ (1,∞) ∀ i ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
(57)
Because of the parameters αi, βi, i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, the utility functions in (57) are strictly concave over their
domains. Therefore, there is a unique optimum action profile aˆ∗ = (aˆ∗1, aˆ
∗
2, aˆ
∗
3) corresponding to the central-
ized problem (PC) defined in (7). This optimum action profile aˆ∗ is the solution to∇aˆ(
∑
i∈{1,2,3} ui(aˆ1, aˆ2, aˆ3)) =
33
0. Computing the gradient in this equation we obtain,
α1 aˆ
∗(α1−1)
1 − 2 β1 aˆ∗(β1−1)1
α2 aˆ
∗(α2−1)
2 − 2 β2 aˆ∗(β2−1)2
α3 aˆ
∗(α3−1)
3 − 2 β3 aˆ∗(β3−1)3
 = 0
⇒

aˆ∗1
aˆ∗2
aˆ∗3
 =

(
α1
2β1
)1/(β1−α1)(
α2
2β2
)1/(β2−α2)(
α3
2β3
)1/(β3−α3)
 (58)
Note that because αi < βi ∀ i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, the action profile aˆ∗ in (58) lies in A1 ×A2 ×A3 and hence
is feasible. Equation (58) thus gives the optimum centralized action profile.
We now show the properties of the game form presented in Section III-A.
We first show that the game induced by this game form under the above problem instance has a Nash
equilibrium. Consider the following message profile of the users:
m∗1 =
(
( a1 ∗1, a
1 ∗
2, a
1 ∗
3), ( pi
1 ∗
1, pi
1 ∗
2, pi
1 ∗
3)
)
=
(
(aˆ∗1, aˆ
∗
2, aˆ
∗
3), (2β1aˆ
∗(β1−1)
1 , β2aˆ
∗(β2−1)
2 , 3β3aˆ
∗(β3−1)
3 )
)
,
m∗2 =
(
( a2 ∗1, a
2 ∗
2, a
2 ∗
3), ( pi
2 ∗
1, pi
2 ∗
2, pi
2 ∗
3)
)
=
(
(aˆ∗1, aˆ
∗
2, aˆ
∗
3), (3β1aˆ
∗(β1−1)
1 , 2β2aˆ
∗(β2−1)
2 , β3aˆ
∗(β3−1)
3 )
)
,
m∗3 =
(
( a3 ∗1, a
3 ∗
2, a
3 ∗
3), ( pi
3 ∗
1, pi
3 ∗
2, pi
3 ∗
3)
)
=
(
(aˆ∗1, aˆ
∗
2, aˆ
∗
3), (β1aˆ
∗(β1−1)
1 , 3β2aˆ
∗(β2−1)
2 , 2β3aˆ
∗(β3−1)
3 )
)
.
(59)
The vector (aˆ∗1, aˆ
∗
2, aˆ
∗
3) on the right hand side (RHS) of (59) is the optimum centralized action profile
computed in (58), and βi, i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, are the parameters of the utility functions in (57). Because
βi ∈ (1,∞) ∀ i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, and (aˆ∗1, aˆ∗2, aˆ∗3) ∈ A1×A2×A3, (59) implies that pii ∗j ∈ R+ ∀ i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
Hence the message profile given in (59) lies in the message space (defined by (8), (9)) of the proposed
game form.
We will now show that the above message profile is a Nash equilibrium of the game induced by the
proposed game form and the users’ utility functions in (57). To this end we will show that,
m∗1 ∈ arg max
m1∈R3×R3+
{
u1
((
aˆi(m1,m
∗
2,m
∗
3)
)
i∈{1,2,3}
)− tˆ1(m1,m∗2,m∗3)} , (60)
m∗2 ∈ arg max
m2∈R3×R3+
{
u2
((
aˆi(m
∗
1,m2,m
∗
3)
)
i∈{1,2,3}
)− tˆ2(m∗1,m2,m∗3)} , (61)
m∗3 ∈ arg max
m3∈R3×R3+
{
u3
((
aˆi(m
∗
1,m
∗
2,m3)
)
i∈{1,2,3}
)− tˆ3(m∗1,m∗2,m3)} , (62)
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where, ui, i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, are the utility functions defined in (57), and aˆi, tˆi, i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, are the action and
tax functions of the game form defined by equations (10)–(12). Below we present a derivation for (60).
The conditions (61) and (62) can be derived similarly.
Let the indexing of the users for tax computation be the same as their original indexing, i.e. users 1, 2, 3
are labeled as 1, 2, 3 in all the cycles C1, C2, C3 (consisting of all three users) used in tax functions. Then,
using equations (11), (12), the tax of user 1 at message profile (m1,m∗2,m
∗
3) is:
tˆ1(m1,m
∗
2,m
∗
3) =
(
pi2 ∗1 − pi3 ∗1
) 1
3
(
a1 1 + a
2 ∗
1 + a
3 ∗
1
)
+
(
pi2 ∗2 − pi3 ∗2
) 1
3
(
a1 2 + a
2 ∗
2 + a
3 ∗
2
)
+
(
pi2 ∗3 − pi3 ∗3
) 1
3
(
a1 3 + a
2 ∗
3 + a
3 ∗
3
)
+ pi1 1
(
a1 1 − a2 ∗1
)2
+ pi1 2
(
a1 2 − a2 ∗2
)2
+ pi1 3
(
a1 3 − a2 ∗3
)2
− pi2 ∗1
(
a2 ∗1 − a3 ∗1
)2 − pi2 ∗2( a2 ∗2 − a3 ∗2)2 − pi2 ∗3( a2 ∗3 − a3 ∗3)2.
(63)
The last three terms on the RHS of (63) are zero from the definition of ai ∗j , i ∈ {2, 3}, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, in
(59). Substituting the remaining terms of tˆ1 in the argument of (60) and expanding u1 we obtain,
u1
((
aˆi(m1,m
∗
2,m
∗
3)
)
i∈{1,2,3}
)− tˆ1(m1,m∗2,m∗3) =(1
3
(
a1 1 + a
2 ∗
1 + a
3 ∗
1
))α1 − (1
3
(
a1 2 + a
2 ∗
2 + a
3 ∗
2
))β2 − (1
3
(
a1 3 + a
2 ∗
3 + a
3 ∗
3
))β3 − 1
3
(
pi2 ∗1 − pi3 ∗1
)
(
a1 1 + a
2 ∗
1 + a
3 ∗
1
)− 1
3
(
pi2 ∗2 − pi3 ∗2
)(
a1 2 + a
2 ∗
2 + a
3 ∗
2
)− 1
3
(
pi2 ∗3 − pi3 ∗3
)(
a1 3 + a
2 ∗
3 + a
3 ∗
3
)
− pi1 1
(
a1 1 − a2 ∗1
)2 − pi1 2( a1 2 − a2 ∗2)2 − pi1 3( a1 3 − a2 ∗3)2.
(64)
Note that the last three terms on the RHS of (64) are non positive for all messages
(
( a1 1, a
1
2, a
1
3),
( pi1 1, pi
1
2, pi
1
3)
) ∈ R3 × R3+. Furthermore, the price proposals ( pi1 1, pi1 2, pi1 3) of user 1 affect only these
three terms on the RHS of (64). Therefore, in any message m1 that maximizes (64), if a1 1 6= a2 ∗1 then
pi1 1 = 0 because pi
1
1 can independently control the value of the quadratic term pi
1
1
(
a1 1− a2 ∗1
)2. Similarly,
if a1 2 6= a2 ∗2 and a1 3 6= a2 ∗3, then pi1 2 = 0 and pi1 3 = 0. Consequently, the last three terms on the RHS
of (64) must be zero at any message that maximizes this expression. As a result, the maximization of
(64) with respect to (w.r.t) m1 is equivalent to the maximization of the following function g( a1 1, a
1
2, a
1
3)
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w.r.t. ( a1 1, a
1
2, a
1
3):
g( a1 1, a
1
2, a
1
3) :=(1
3
(
a1 1 + a
2 ∗
1 + a
3 ∗
1
))α1 − (1
3
(
a1 2 + a
2 ∗
2 + a
3 ∗
2
))β2 − (1
3
(
a1 3 + a
2 ∗
3 + a
3 ∗
3
))β3 − 1
3
(
pi2 ∗1 − pi3 ∗1
)
(
a1 1 + a
2 ∗
1 + a
3 ∗
1
)− 1
3
(
pi2 ∗2 − pi3 ∗2
)(
a1 2 + a
2 ∗
2 + a
3 ∗
2
)− 1
3
(
pi2 ∗3 − pi3 ∗3
)(
a1 3 + a
2 ∗
3 + a
3 ∗
3
) (65)
Because of the values of the parameters α1, β2 and β3, the function g( a1 1, a
1
2, a
1
3) is strictly concave.
Therefore, the maximizer of the function is the solution to ∇( a1 1, a1 2, a1 3)g( a1 1, a1 2, a1 3) = 0. Solving this
equation we obtain, 
1
3
α1
(
1
3
(
a1 1 + a
2 ∗
1 + a
3 ∗
1
))α1−1 − 1
3
(
pi2 ∗1 − pi3 ∗1
)
−1
3
β2
(
1
3
(
a1 2 + a
2 ∗
2 + a
3 ∗
2
))β2−1 − 1
3
(
pi2 ∗2 − pi3 ∗2
)
−1
3
β3
(
1
3
(
a1 3 + a
2 ∗
3 + a
3 ∗
3
))β3−1 − 1
3
(
pi2 ∗3 − pi3 ∗3
)
 = 0. (66)
Substituting the values of ai ∗j , pi
i ∗
j , i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, from (59) into (66) implies that,
α1
(
1
3
(
a1 1 + 2aˆ
∗
1
))α1−1 − 2β1aˆ∗(β1−1)1
−β2
(
1
3
(
a1 2 + 2aˆ
∗
2
))β2−1
+ β2aˆ
∗(β2−1)
2
−β3
(
1
3
(
a1 3 + 2aˆ
∗
3
))β3−1
+ β3aˆ
∗(β3−1)
3
 = 0. (67)
Substituting the values of aˆ∗1, aˆ
∗
2, aˆ
∗
3 from (58) into (67), and solving for a
1
1, a
1
2, a
1
3, we obtain,

a1 1
a1 2
a1 3
 =

3
(
2β1
α1
(
α1
2β1
) β1−1
β1−α1
) 1
α1−1
− 2
(
α1
2β1
) 1
β1−α1
3
(
aˆ∗
(β2−1)
2
) 1
β2−1 − 2aˆ∗2
3
(
aˆ∗
(β3−1)
3
) 1
β3−1 − 2aˆ∗3
 =

(
α1
2β1
) 1
β1−α1
aˆ∗2
aˆ∗3
 =

a1 ∗1
a1 ∗2
a1 ∗3
 (68)
The last equality in (68) follows from the definition of a1 ∗1, a
1 ∗
2, a
1 ∗
3 in (59) and the value of the centralized
optimum in (58). Note that for ( a1 1, a
1
2, a
1
3) = ( a
1 ∗
1, a
1 ∗
2, a
1 ∗
3), the last three quadratic terms in (64) are
zero for all ( pi1 1, pi
1
2, pi
1
3) (since a
1 ∗
1 = a
2 ∗
1, a
1 ∗
2 = a
2 ∗
2, a
1 ∗
3 = a
2 ∗
3 by (59)). Hence, any price proposal
( pi1 1, pi
1
2, pi
1
3) along with ( a
1 ∗
1, a
1 ∗
2, a
1 ∗
3) is a maximizer of (64). Consequently, the message m
∗
1 defined
in (59) is a maximizer in (60).
By following similar arguments as above, the conditions (61) and (62) can also be derived. Thus, the
message profile m∗ = (m∗1,m
∗
2,m
∗
3) is a NE of the game under consideration.
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We now show that the allocations obtained at the above NE possess the properties established by
Theorem 1.
By substituting the messages defined by (59) into equation (10) we obtain,
aˆ1(m
∗)
aˆ2(m
∗)
aˆ3(m
∗)
 =

1
3
(
a1 ∗1 + a
2 ∗
1 + a
3 ∗
1
)
1
3
(
a1 ∗2 + a
2 ∗
2 + a
3 ∗
2
)
1
3
(
a1 ∗3 + a
2 ∗
3 + a
3 ∗
3
)
 =

aˆ∗1
aˆ∗2
aˆ∗3
 . (69)
Thus (69) shows that the allocation at Nash equilibrium m∗ is the optimal centralized allocation aˆ∗.
To see budget balance at m∗, note that the last six terms on the RHS of (63) are zero at m = m∗.
Similarly, the corresponding terms in the taxes of users 2 and 3 will also be zero. Adding the remaining
terms in the users’ taxes gives,
∑
i∈{1,2,3}tˆi(m
∗) =
(
pi2 ∗1 − pi3 ∗1
)
aˆ∗1 +
(
pi2 ∗2 − pi3 ∗2
)
aˆ∗2 +
(
pi2 ∗3 − pi3 ∗3
)
aˆ∗3
+
(
pi3 ∗1 − pi1 ∗1
)
aˆ∗1 +
(
pi3 ∗2 − pi1 ∗2
)
aˆ∗2 +
(
pi3 ∗3 − pi1 ∗3
)
aˆ∗3
+
(
pi1 ∗1 − pi2 ∗1
)
aˆ∗1 +
(
pi1 ∗2 − pi2 ∗2
)
aˆ∗2 +
(
pi1 ∗3 − pi2 ∗3
)
aˆ∗3
= 0.
(70)
Voluntary participation at m∗ can be seen by substituting m∗ from (59) into ui(aˆ(m∗))− tˆi(m∗), i ∈
{1, 2, 3}, and computing this aggregate utility for each user using (57), (58), (59) and (10)–(12). The
computation shows that ui(aˆ(m∗)) − tˆi(m∗) ≥ 0 ∀ i ∈ {1, 2, 3} which means that the users obtain at
least zero utility at m∗ which is same as the utility they would obtain if they do not participate in the
mechanism.
